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Exploring Unexplored Frontiers: The Private Right of 
Action Under the Louisiana Securities Law 
Stephen Miles 
INTRODUCTION 
In early 2007, an increase in subprime mortgage defaults 
caused some softness in the financial markets. Later in 2007, that 
softness spread and intensified, causing a liquidity and credit crisis 
affecting even prime mortgages. Still later, in 2008, the crisis 
expanded further, resulting in the collapse of one of the most 
venerated investment banks on Wall Street—Lehman Brothers. 
The crisis continued with an economic recession that some say was 
the worst since the Great Depression in the 1930s.1 
During this period of economic turmoil, stock market indices, 
such as the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the S&P 500, tumbled. 
The multi-trillion dollar market for fixed-income investments, such as 
asset-backed securities, lost even more value. Not surprisingly, 
investments of both institutional investors and individuals saving for 
retirement declined in value. In the wake of these losses, investors 
sued either their financial advisors or others involved in the sale of the 
securities that turned out to be poor investments.  
Louisiana was not immune to the poor conditions in the 
financial markets, and many Louisiana investors whose investments 
lost value, like those in other states, brought lawsuits seeking to 
recoup their losses. Such investors often invoked the Louisiana 
Securities Law, which was originally enacted in 19202 and was 
later re-enacted in 1985.3 These investors, or their attorneys, likely 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2015, by STEPHEN MILES. 
  Mr. Miles has devoted much of his practice to representing individuals 
and corporations in claims arising under the Louisiana Securities Law and federal 
securities laws. The views and opinions expressed herein are not necessarily the 
views and opinions of any other person or entity and should not be viewed as 
such. 
 1. See Lawrence Mishel & Heidi Sheirholz, The Worst Downturn Since the 
Great Depression, ECON. POLICY INST. (June 2, 2009), http://www.epi.org/publi 
cation/jobspict_200906_preview/, archived at http://perma.cc/GYD6-GTN3. 
 2. State v. Powdrill, 684 So. 2d 350, 353 (La. 1996) (“Louisiana enacted 
its first blue sky law in 1920.”). State securities laws, including Louisiana’s, are 
often referred to as “blue sky laws.” See id. The Louisiana Supreme Court offers 
that this moniker is derived from a United States Supreme Court decision 
describing the purpose of state securities laws “as the prevention of ‘speculative 
schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of blue sky.’” Id. (citing 
Steven M. Axler, Comment, The Blue Sky Laws of Louisiana, 41 LOY. L. REV. 1 
(1995) (quoting Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917))). 
 3. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:701–724 (2003). 




found that, despite being on the books for years, the Louisiana 
Securities Law had infrequently been interpreted by Louisiana 
courts, leaving investors with little guidance on certain important 
issues. 
This Article explores the private right of action under the 
Louisiana Securities Law, noting interpretations of that law 
provided recently by courts in the wake of the financial crisis and 
recession.4 It also examines those provisions of the law that have not 
often been interpreted by the courts, offering comparisons of the 
language of Louisiana’s private right of action to that of its federal 
analogue, section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, which may be 
utilized to fill the gap left by the dearth of Louisiana Securities Law 
cases that exists even after the 2008–2009 financial crisis. 
I. THE FEDERAL SECURITIES ANTIFRAUD PROVISIONS 
An understanding of the private right of action under the 
Louisiana Securities Law requires a review of the federal securities 
private right of action on which the Louisiana Securities Law is 
based.5 There are at least two provisions of federal securities laws 
that have relevance here: section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 
1933 and section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 
and Rule 10b–5 promulgated thereunder. 
A. Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 
In the wake of the stock market crash of 1929, Congress 
undertook to regulate transactions in securities.6 As part of this 
effort, Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933. Section 12(2) 
of that Act provides a private remedy for purchasers of securities 
in an initial distribution of securities where the sale is made by 
                                                                                                             
 4. To the author’s knowledge, no such examination of the provisions of the 
Louisiana Securities Law has appeared in any publication since 1995 when a 
helpful piece was published in the Loyola Law Review. See Axler, supra note 2, 
at 1. This Article provides an update in light of the recent financial crisis, with a 
focus on the private right of action available under the Louisiana Securities Law. 
 5. See Powdrill, 684 So. 2d at 353 (Louisiana courts “look to the federal 
law and jurisprudence interpreting the securities law for guidance in interpreting 
the Louisiana provisions.”); see also Heck v. Triche, 775 F.3d 265, 282 (5th Cir. 
2014) (“Because there is a dearth of law interpreting the definition of a seller 
under the state statute, we look to federal law interpreting the Louisiana law’s 
model.”). 
 6. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 (1976). 




means of “an untrue statement of a material fact” or an omission.7 
The cause of action may be brought against “[a]ny person who”: 
Offers or sells a security . . . by means of a prospectus or oral 
communication, which includes an untrue statement of a 
material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements, in the light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser 
not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not 
sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the 
exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such 
untruth or omission.8 
The cause of action is a narrow one. It is only available to 
securities purchasers—not securities sellers—and may only be 
brought against so-called statutory sellers.9 Although the law applies 
to oral communications as well as prospectuses,10 it is directed 
primarily at the initial distribution of securities, rather than at 
secondary market transactions.11 Purchasers also need not prove 
scienter12 or reliance,13 but instead must merely prove that they did 
not know of the untruth or omission.14 Purchasers, however, must 
prove that the untruth concerned a material fact or that an omitted 
fact was material.15  
The text of section 12(2) offers a statutory seller two defenses 
in addition to the common law defenses that have been recognized 
by various courts.16 The seller can offer evidence “that he did not 
know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have 
                                                                                                             
 7. See Securities Act of 1933, § 12(2) (as amended), 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) 
(2012). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 641–42, 647–54 (1988). See also Cortec 
Indus. v. Sum Holding, 949 F.2d 42, 50 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding that section 12 
liability extends to sellers, but not purchasers). 
 10. § 12(2). 
 11. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 578 (1995). 
 12. Scienter generally means acting “with intent to deceive, manipulate, or 
defraud.” Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983). 
 13. See Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 576 (stating that section 12(2) provides 
“buyers a right to rescind without proof of reliance”); Schlesinger v. Herzog, 2 
F.3d 135, 141 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that scienter and reliance are not 
elements of a section 12(2) claim). 
 14. § 12(2).  
 15. See, e.g., Simpson v. Se. Inv. Trust, 697 F.2d 1257, 1258 (5th Cir. 1983) 
(describing materiality standard for Section 12(2) claims); TSC Indus. v. 
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 444–47 (1976) (discussing materiality standard 
for claim brought pursuant to section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934). 
 16. See infra note 131. 




known, of such untruth or omission.”17 The seller can also reduce 
the damage recoverable by showing that the damages sought were 
not caused by the untruth or omission.18  
The damages recoverable by a purchaser under section 12(2) are 
significant. A purchaser may obtain from a statutory seller found 
liable rescission or damages calculated based upon the consideration 
paid if the purchaser no longer owns the security.19 
B. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 
10b–5 
The second relevant federal remedy was not expressly created 
by Congress but rather is an implied remedy long ago recognized 
by the United States Supreme Court. For many years, the Court has 
recognized that securities market participants have a private right 
of action under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
193420 and Rule 10b–521 promulgated thereunder.22 Rule 10b–5 
states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the 
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or 
of the mails or of any facility of any national securities 
exchange, 
 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to 
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading, or 
                                                                                                             
 17. § 12(2); Junker v. Crory, 650 F.2d 1349, 1361 (5th Cir. 1981) (“Section 
12(2) provides the seller a defense if he sustains ‘the burden [of] proof that he 
did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of 
(the) untruth or omission . . . .’” (quoting section 12(2)). 
 18. § 12(2). 
 19. Id. An aggrieved purchaser may sue “to recover the consideration paid 
for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received 
thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns 
the security.” Id. 
 20. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
 21. Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–
5 (2014). 
 22. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 
n.9 (1971) (confirming the existence of private cause of action under Rule 10b–
5); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) (“[A] private 
right of action under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b–5 has been 
consistently recognized for more than 35 years. The existence of this implied 
remedy is simply beyond peradventure.”). 




(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business 
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon 
any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security.23  
The implied right of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 
has six elements: (1) material misrepresentation (or omission); (2) 
scienter; (3) a connection with a purchase or sale of a security; (4) 
reliance; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.24 Section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b–5 provide a private cause of action in a wider variety 
of circumstances than does a claim under section 12(2) of the 
Securities Act of 1933. For example, the Supreme Court has 
interpreted Rule 10b–5 to provide a private right of action for 
purchasers and sellers of securities, unlike section 12(2) claims, 
which may be brought only by purchasers.25 Rule 10b–5 also is not 
limited to securities bought or sold in an initial distribution.26  
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 claims, however, require the 
plaintiff to bear a heavier burden of proof than the plaintiff 
bringing a section 12(2) claim.27 To prove a Rule 10b–5 claim, a 
plaintiff is required to show both reliance and loss causation,28 
although there is a presumption of reliance in failure-to-disclose 
cases.29 As well, a section 10(b)/Rule 10b–5 plaintiff must prove 
that “the defendant acted with scienter,”30 rather than merely 
proving negligence. 
                                                                                                             
 23. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2014). 
 24. Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005). 
 25. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730–31 
(1975) (affirming rule that private action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 is 
available only to purchasers and sellers of securities). 
 26. Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 382 (noting the cause of action “can be brought 
by a purchaser or seller of ‘any security’ against ‘any person’ who has used ‘any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance’ in connection with the 
purchase or sale of a security”). 
 27. Id. 
 28. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 159 
(2008) (“Reliance by the plaintiff upon the defendant’s deceptive acts is an 
essential element of the § 10(b) private cause of action.”); Dura Pharmaceuticals, 
544 U.S. at 338 (“A private plaintiff who claims securities fraud must prove that 
the defendant’s fraud caused an economic loss.”). 
 29. See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153–
54 (1972) (“Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure 
to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that is 
necessary is that the facts withheld be material in the sense that a reasonable 
investor might have considered them important in the making of this decision.”). 
 30. Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 382. See also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 
U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (holding that a private cause of action for damages under 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 will not lie “in the absence of any allegation of 
‘scienter’—intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud”). 




II. A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER THE LOUISIANA 
SECURITIES LAW—LOUISIANA’S ANALOGUE TO SECTION 12(2) 
OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 
The Louisiana Securities Law provides a private right of action 
roughly analogous to a federal section 12(2) claim. Two provisions 
of the Louisiana Securities Law create the private right of action. 
First, Louisiana Revised Statutes section 51:712(A)(2), which has 
language analogous to section 12(2), prohibits certain practices in 
connection with the sale of securities. Separately, Louisiana 
Revised Statutes section 51:714(A) creates a private right of action 
against those who violate section 712(A)(2).31 While a section 
712(A)(2) claim is different from a federal section 12(2) claim in 
several important ways,32 Louisiana courts are nearly uniform in 
recognizing that section 712(A)(2) is the analogue to section 12(2) 
of the Securities Act of 1933.33 
The Louisiana Securities Law also includes language similar to 
section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 
10b–5, which can be found in Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
51:712(D). Like its federal counterpart, Louisiana Revised Statutes 
section 51:712(D) prohibits “any person in connection with the 
offer, sale, or purchase of any security,” from “employ[ing] any 
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.”34 However, the section 
                                                                                                             
 31. Section 714(A) also creates a private right of action for violations of 
section 712(A)(1) and section 712(A)(3), which contain registration requirements 
for securities and those who sell them. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:714(A) (2003). 
 32. See infra Part III. 
 33. See Heck v. Triche, 775 F.3d 265, 279 (5th Cir. 2014) (“Section 712 of 
the Louisiana Securities Law . . . is not based on Section 10(b) of the Securities 
and Exchange Act of 1934, but is ‘[m]odeled after Section 12(2) of the 
Securities Act of 1933.’” (citation omitted) (quoting State v. Powdrill, 684 So. 
2d 350, 354 (La. 1996))); Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 286 (5th 
Cir. 1992) (“The Louisiana Blue Sky Laws . . . were patterned after the 1933 
Act.”); Bamburg v. Axis Onshore LP, No. 08-1466, 2009 WL 1579512, at *8–9 
(W.D. La. June 4, 2009) (describing claim under Section 712(A) as “Louisiana’s 
§ 12(2) equivalent”); State v. Powdrill, 684 So. 2d 350, 353 (La. 1996) (“The 
provisions of the Louisiana Securities Law, (formerly known as Louisiana Blue 
Sky Law) are analogous to the provisions of the federal Securities Act of 
1933.”); Ponthier v. Manalla, 951 So. 2d 1242, 1254 (La. Ct. App. 2007) (“The 
provisions of the Louisiana Securities Law are analogous to the provisions of the 
Federal Securities Act of 1933 . . . .”); Taylor v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 533 So. 
2d 1383, 1385 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (“[T]he parties agree that parts of the 
Louisiana Blue Sky Law are analogous to provisions of the federal Securities 
Act of 1933 and that LSA-R.S. 51:712(A)(2) is analogous to Section 12(2) of 
the 1933 Act.”). But see Landry v. Thibaut, 523 So. 2d 1370, 1379 (La. Ct. App. 
1988) (stating that the language of the predecessor to Section 712(A) “closely 
tracks that of rule 10b–5”). 
 34. Section 712(D), in its entirety, provides: 




conferring the private right of action, section 714(A), does not 
include any language granting a private right of action against 
those who violate the Louisiana analogue to federal Rule 10b–5.35 
Relying on the language of section 714(A), Louisiana federal 
courts and one state court have rejected attempts by investors to 
assert a private right of action under section 712(D), the state 
version of Rule 10b–5, in cases decided both before and after the 
most recent financial crisis began.36 The conclusions reached by 
these courts are largely supported by the interplay between the 
federal and state schemes. As previously noted, the Louisiana 
Securities Law and, in particular, sections 712 and 714 were re-
enacted in 1985.37 By that time, the United States Supreme Court 
had, on multiple occasions, recognized an implied private right of 
action for violations of section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5.38 Securities 
plaintiffs have argued that the Louisiana Legislature believed that 
by enacting language similar to section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5, it 
was confirming the existence of a private right of action under 
Louisiana law. But, more likely, the Legislature’s choice when re-
enacting the Louisiana Securities Law not to include any language 
expressly creating a private right of action for violations of section 
712(D) suggests an intent not to create such a right. In contrast, 
other states, such as Alabama and Tennessee, have explicitly 
included a cause of action for violations of the state counterpart to 
                                                                                                             
 
It shall be unlawful for any person in connection with the offer, sale, or 
purchase of any security, directly or indirectly: 
(1) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud. 
(2) To engage in any transaction, act, practice, or course of business 
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser 
or seller. 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:712(D) (2003). 
 35. See id. § 51:714(A) (providing right to recover damages against “[a]ny 
person who violates R.S. 51:712(A)”). 
 36. See Blanchard v. Lee, No. 13-220, 2013 WL 5701667, at *3 (E.D. La. 
Oct. 18, 2013) (“Louisiana law does not support the § 51:712(D) claim relied on 
by plaintiffs in their opposition.”); Tranchina v. Howard, Weil, Labouisse, 
Friedrichs, Inc., No. 95-2886, 1996 WL 312026, at *5 (E.D. La. June 7, 1996) 
(noting the investor had no right of action for violation of Section 712(D), the 
analogue to federal Rule 10b–5); see also Hiern v. Sarpy, No. 94-835, 1995 WL 
640528, at *16 (E.D. La. Oct. 31, 1995) (same); Dendinger v. First Nat’l Corp., 
Nos. 87–4611, 88–0165 & 89–0824, 1992 WL 318593, at *9 (E.D. La. Oct. 28, 
1992) (same); Solow v. Heard McElroy & Vestal, L.L.P., 7 So. 3d 1269, 1281–
82 (La. Ct. App. 2009).  
 37. See supra text accompanying note 3; see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
51:712, 51:714 (2003). 
 38. See supra text accompanying note 22. 




Rule 10b–5.39 It is thus reasonable to conclude that the Louisiana 
Legislature, which is deemed to know relevant Rule 10b–5 
jurisprudence,40 deliberately chose not to provide a private right of 
action to remedy violations of section 712(D). 
III. STATUTORY ELEMENTS OF A PRIVATE CLAIM 
UNDER SECTION 712(A)(2) 
With no private right of action available to remedy violations 
of section 712(D), the primary state law remedy for Louisiana 
investors is found in section 712(A)(2). Section 712(A)(2) of the 
Louisiana Securities Law reads as follows: 
A. It shall be unlawful for any person: 
 
* * * 
 
(2) To offer to sell or to sell a security by means of any oral 
or written untrue statement of a material fact or any 
omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make 
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they are made, not misleading, the buyer not 
knowing of the untruth or omission, if such person in the 
exercise of reasonable care could not have known of the 
untruth or omission.41 
Unpacking this language, it appears that the text of the 
Louisiana Securities Law sets forth four principal elements: (1) an 
offer or sale of a security; (2) such offer or sale is by means of any 
oral or written untrue statement of fact or any omission of fact; (3) 
the statement or omission relates to a material fact; and (4) the 
buyer does not know of the untruth or omission. A fifth element 
exists, but has been interpreted in such different ways as to make 
                                                                                                             
 39. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-2-122(a)(1) (West 2015) (setting forth 
liability for those who “sell a security” in violation of Section 48-2-121(a), 
which itself includes language analogous to both Section 12(2) and Rule 10b–5); 
see also ALA. CODE § 8-6-19(a) (2002) (setting forth liability for those who sell 
securities in violation of any provision of the Act, which includes both an 
analogue to Section 12(2) and Rule 10b–5).  
 40. Borel v. Young, 989 So. 2d 42, 48 (La. 2007) (“A long line of 
jurisprudence holds that those who enact statutory provisions are presumed to 
act deliberately and with full knowledge of existing laws on the same subject, 
with awareness of court cases and well-established principles of statutory 
construction, with knowledge of the effect of their acts and a purpose in view, 
and that when the Legislature changes the wording of a statute, it is presumed to 
have intended a change in the law.”). 
 41. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:712(A)(2) (2003). 




describing it succinctly in a list of elements next to impossible. The 
statute requires that “such person in the exercise of reasonable care 
could not have known of the untruth or omission,” but the cases 
diverge widely on who—plaintiff–purchaser or defendant–seller—
bears the burden of proof on this point as well as on what must be 
proven, with most cases holding that the defendant’s reasonable 
care is at issue, while at least one case holds that this “element” 
concerns the diligence of the plaintiff.42 Finally, more than one 
case provides that loss causation is an element of a Louisiana 
Securities Law claim.43 
Judicial interpretations of the elements of a section 712(A)(2) 
claim are discussed below, with particular emphasis on those 
provisions that have recently been interpreted by Louisiana courts 
as well as on those provisions that remain unexamined. In both 
instances, the discussion compares section 712(A)(2) and section 
12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933. A wealth of caselaw 
interpreting section 12(2) has developed over the years and 
provides much-needed guidance in interpreting section 712(A)(2). 
A. The “Seller” Requirement Under Louisiana Law 
An analysis of the text of section 712(A)(2) confirms that the 
Louisiana Securities Law includes a requirement that the defendant be 
a “seller” of securities. For comparison purposes, section 12(2) of the 
federal Securities Act of 1933 applies to “any person who . . . offers 
or sells a security.”44 Because this language specifically refers to the 
actions of “offer[ing]” and “sell[ing],” courts interpreting section 
12(2) have concluded that a section 12(2) claim may only be 
brought against a seller of securities, not a purchaser.45  
The equivalent portion of section 712(A)(2) includes nearly 
identical language, rendering it unlawful “[t]o offer to sell or to sell 
a security” if the other elements of the cause of action are met.46 
Section 712(A)(2) also references the “buyer” needing to prove 
                                                                                                             
 42. See infra Part III.F and cases cited therein. 
 43.  Fishman v. Morgan Keegan & Co., No. 10–2, 2011 WL 4853367, at 
*11 (E.D. La. Oct. 13, 2011) (“Loss causation is . . . an essential element of 
Plaintiffs’ claims under Louisiana’s Blue Sky Law.”), aff’d on other grounds by 
Fishman v. Morgan Keegan & Co., 574 F. App’x 449 (5th Cir. 2014). See also 
Williams v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 556 So. 2d 914, 916 (La. Ct. App. 1990) 
(explaining that a claim under the Louisiana Blue Sky Law “is governed by the 
causation standard articulated in numerous federal cases interpreting federal 
securities law”). 
 44. Securities Act of 1933, § 12(2) (as amended), 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (2012).  
 45. See, e.g., Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding, L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 50 (2d 
Cir. 1991) (stating that section 12 liability extends to seller, not purchasers). 
 46. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:712(A)(2) (2003). 




that he did not know “of the untruth or omission.”47 Although 
caselaw interpreting this language in section 712(A)(2) is sparse 
even after the 2008–2009 financial crisis, the language of the 
statute suggests that a state law claim for violating section 
712(A)(2) may only be brought by a buyer against a seller of a 
security, not by a seller against a buyer.  
A question exists regarding who is a “seller”—the person or 
entity who solicited the sale or transferred title, or others more 
tangentially involved in the sale, such as lawyers and accountants. 
The United States Supreme Court answered this question in 1988 
in Pinter v. Dahl with respect to section 12(2)’s “seller” 
requirement, which is analogous to section 712(A). In Pinter, as 
recognized by one federal court in Louisiana,  
The Supreme Court held that generally, liability should not 
extend beyond those who offer securities for [sale] or solicit 
offers for sale but that inclusion of the phrase “solicitation of 
an offer to buy” within the [federal] definition of “offer” 
brings a non-owner who engages in solicitation within the 
scope of the [Securities Act of 1933].48  
Pinter overruled a line of federal precedent that had interpreted 
“seller” in section 12(2) broadly to cover all persons who were a 
“substantial factor” in bringing about the transaction, including 
lawyers and accountants.49 
Despite Pinter’s narrowing of the persons who are statutory 
“sellers” under section 12(2), and the similarity in language 
                                                                                                             
 47. Id. 
 48. Keller v. Bryan-Worley & Co., Nos. 88-1620, 88-1722, 1989 WL 1771, 
at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 10, 1989) (citing Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 641–42, 647–
54 (1988)). See also Taylor v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 533 So. 2d 1383, 1384–86 
(La. Ct. App. 1988) (concluding that investor stated a claim pursuant to section 
712(A) where broker allegedly “used ‘high pressure’ sales techniques and 
fraudulent misrepresentations to induce him to make a number of purchases of 
extremely speculative stock”). 
 49. See Pharo v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656, 667 (5th Cir. 1980) (Section 12(2) 
liability reaches to those “whose participation in the buy-sell transaction is a 
substantial factor in causing the transaction to take place.”), overruled by Pinter, 
486 U.S. at 648–55. Of note, the Supreme Court in Pinter interpreted section 
12(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, which is identical to section 12(2). See 
Pinter, 486 U.S. at 648–55. Federal appellate courts have since followed Pinter 
in confirming that the substantial factor test does not apply to section 12(2) 
claims. See, e.g., Ryder Int’l Corp. v. First Am. Nat’l Bank, 943 F.2d 1521, 
1527 (11th Cir. 1991) (“Much of the same reasoning the Supreme Court used to 
reject the substantial-factor test as employed by the Fifth Circuit to determine 
section 12(1)’s scope, also applies to whether that test has continued validity 
under section 12(2) . . . .” (citations omitted)); Capri v. Murphy, 856 F.2d 473, 
478–79 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that Pinter applies to section 12(2)). 




between section 12(2) and section 712(A)(2), the timing of the 
enactment of section 712(A)(2) allows an argument for a broader 
interpretation of “seller”—one that potentially includes lawyers, 
accountants, or others involved in the sale of securities. As noted 
above, the Louisiana Securities Law was re-enacted in 1985. At 
that time, the language of section 12(2) was interpreted broadly 
under the line of precedent later overruled by Pinter. Anyone 
determined to be a “substantial factor” in bringing about the sale 
was considered to have “[o]ffer[ed] or s[old] a security” for 
purposes of section 12(2) liability.50 Against this legal backdrop, 
which the Louisiana Legislature is deemed to know, the 
Legislature re-enacted the Louisiana Securities Law using the 
language of federal section 12(2) that was then being interpreted 
broadly.51 It is therefore at least plausible that the Louisiana 
Securities Law should be interpreted to allow a cause of action 
against anyone who is a “substantial factor” in bringing about the 
sale.52 However, because the Supreme Court in Pinter rejected the 
“substantial factor” test based upon its careful reading of the 
language employed in section 12(2), and because the language of 
the Louisiana Securities Law is identical in relevant respects to that 
of section 12(2), the substantial factor test likely does not have 
much of a foothold in Louisiana law. 
B. By Means of “Any Oral or Written Untrue Statement of 
Material Fact or Omission” 
The second statutory element of a section 712(A)(2) claim has 
been interpreted very infrequently. A comparison of the wording of 
section 712(A)(2) to that of section 12(2), however, provides some 
insight into the meaning of the requirement that the security be 
sold by means of “any oral or written untrue statement of material 
fact or omission.”53  
The federal section 12(2) claim has a limited application. The 
United States Supreme Court in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. held 
that a section 12(2) claim applies only to the sale of securities 
made during the initial distribution of securities, i.e., initial public 
                                                                                                             
 50. See Pharo, 621 F.2d at 667. 
 51. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:712(A)(2) (2003) (imposing liability on those 
who “offer[ed] to sell or [sold] a security”). 
 52. See Solow v. Heard McElroy & Vestal, L.L.P., 7 So. 3d 1269, 1280–81 
(2009) (considering whether an accountant was a substantial factor in bringing 
about a sale in determining potential liability under section 712(A)(2), but 
stopping short of adopting substantial factor test). 
 53. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:712(A)(2) (2003). 




offerings.54 The Court in large part limited the applicability of 
section 12(2) because of that statute’s use of the phrase 
“prospectus.” The Court reasoned that because section 12(2) 
applied to “[a]ny person who . . . [o]ffers or sells a security . . . by 
means of a prospectus or oral communication,” and because the 
term “prospectus” referred to “public offers by an issuer or its 
controlling shareholders,” section 12(2) was limited to initial 
public offerings.55  
Section 712(A)(2), in contrast to section 12(2), does not include 
the phrase “prospectus,” the key word central to the Gustafson 
decision. Instead of the phrase “a prospectus or oral communication, 
which includes an untrue statement of a material fact” found in 
section 12(2), section 712(A)(2) employs the phrase “any oral or 
written untrue statement of a material fact.”56 Section 712(A)(2) 
thus appears to apply to a broader group of transactions than does 
section 12(2). In this regard, the language of section 712(A)(2) 
approximates that of federal Rule 10b–5, which prohibits the 
making of “any untrue statement of material fact”57 and has been 
interpreted to apply beyond the initial distribution of securities.58 
Although no Louisiana case has considered whether there are 
Gustafson-type limitations on section 712(A)(2), the plain text of 
section 712(A)(2) suggests there are not. 
Similar to a section 12(2) claim, the second element of a section 
712(A)(2) claim also includes a requirement that the investor prove 
that the statement made was “untrue” or that a statement is 
“misleading” because of an omitted material fact.59 Although 
countless federal cases discuss in detail whether particular alleged 
statements are untrue as made or misleading without the disclosure 
of additional material facts, there is by comparison a dearth of 
caselaw discussing in detail what the terms “untrue” or “misleading” 
mean in the Louisiana Securities Law. Many older Louisiana cases 
do not mention at all whether the particular statements made were 
untrue or misleading.60 Or, alternatively, the cases address the issue 
                                                                                                             
 54. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co. Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 575–78 (1995). 
 55. Id. at 567–78. 
 56. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:712(A) (2003). 
 57. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2014). 
 58. In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1417 (3d Cir. 
1997) (“The private right of action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 reaches 
beyond statements and omissions made in a registration statement or prospectus 
or in connection with an initial distribution of securities and creates liability for 
false or misleading statements or omissions of material fact that affect trading on 
the secondary market.” (footnote omitted)). 
 59. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:712(A)(2) (2003). 
 60. See, e.g., Taylor v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 533 So. 2d 1383, 1386 (La. 
Ct. App. 1988) (mentioning that plaintiff alleged that the defendant made 




only in passing and with much less explanation of why the statement 
is untrue or misleading than can be found in cases discussing the 
similar requirement under section 12(2).61 Nonetheless, because 
section 712(A)(2) is patterned after section 12(2), litigants can refer 
to the vast body of federal caselaw discussing when a statement is 
“untrue” or “misleading” for guidance. 
One recent Louisiana case provides some guidance, at least for 
cases involving omissions. In Macareno v. Karon, Judge Hicks of 
the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Louisiana considered a claim brought pursuant to the Louisiana 
Securities Law by investors in a mineral lease against the person 
who sold them their interest.62 The transaction was consummated 
when the investors wired their purchase money to the seller, who 
then was to operate the lease.63 Before analyzing the statements at 
issue, the court acknowledged that “affirmative statements or 
misrepresentations” are a prerequisite for a Louisiana Securities 
Law claim.64 It then reasoned that the seller’s “instruction to wire 
the purchase money to [the seller] directly” was misleading 
without an explanation that the money wired would not be used as 
intended.65 The court also noted that the seller immediately after 
the purchase sent to the investors an operating agreement, which 
provided that the seller, through a wholly owned limited liability 
company, would operate the leases, and the court concluded that 
this was misleading without an accompanying disclosure that the 
seller had “limited experience operating mineral leases.”66 Based 
on this reasoning, the court concluded that the investor’s claim 
should survive summary judgment, and the omissions issue should 
be presented to the jury.67 
The Macareno case is one of the only Louisiana cases that 
helpfully explains that affirmative statements or misrepresentations 
are a prerequisite to any omissions claim under section 712(A)(2) 
                                                                                                             
 
“specific allegations” regarding the misstatements of material fact without 
discussing what those misstatements were). 
 61. See, e.g., Se. Wireless Network, Inc. v. U.S. Telemetry Corp., 954 So. 2d 
120, 123 (La. 2007) (referencing the defendant’s alleged “misrepresentations and 
omissions of material fact related to the state of [the defendant corporation’s] 
financial condition and the state of its technology”). 
 62. Macareno v. Karon, No. 08-0292, 2010 WL 743564, at *1 (W.D. La. 
Feb. 24, 2010). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at *6. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 




and provides examples of the types of statements rendered 
misleading by an omission. Nonetheless, there remains a dearth of 
caselaw on point, and reference to the better-developed federal law 
will be of use to investors and sellers alike to determine whether the 
particular statements at issue are “untrue” or “misleading” without 
additional disclosures. 
C. Materiality 
The recent Macareno decision also provides helpful insight 
into the meaning of the materiality requirement under section 
712(A)(2).68 In considering whether certain undisclosed facts were 
material, the court there closely followed federal law, stating that, 
under the Louisiana Securities Law, “the standard for materiality is 
objective, not subjective.”69 Going further, the court articulated a 
working definition of materiality exclusively by reference to 
federal law, concluding that various facts not disclosed to the 
investor were material because such facts “‘would have been 
viewed by the reasonable investor as having altered the total mix 
of information made available.’”70 The Macareno court’s 
articulation of the meaning of materiality and its reliance on 
federal law make sense. Both section 712(A)(2) and section 12(2) 
use the term “material” in similar ways.71 Accordingly, there is no 
reason to believe that materiality under Louisiana law should mean 
anything different than it does under federal law. Although there is 
little caselaw interpreting section 712(A)(2), under Macareno, and 
considering the similarity between the federal and state law, 
litigants and practitioners seeking to interpret “materiality” under 
section 712(A)(2) would be justified in referring to the vast body 
of federal caselaw that explores the contours of what constitutes 
information that “would have been viewed by the reasonable 
investor as having altered the total mix of information made 
available.”72 
                                                                                                             
 68. Id. at *4, 5. 
 69. Id. at *5. 
 70. Id. at *5 (quoting Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 418–19 (5th 
Cir. 2001)). 
 71. Both statutes prohibit certain “untrue statement[s] of material fact” and 
require the disclosure of “material fact[s] necessary in order to make” certain 
statements “not misleading.” See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:712(A)(2) (2003); 
Securities Act of 1933, § 12(2) (as amended), 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (2012). 
 72. Macareno, 2010 WL 743564, at *5. This vast body of federal caselaw 
finds its origins in the Supreme Court case of TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, 
Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976), which explained that to fulfill the materiality 
requirement “there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the 
omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having 




D. The Purchaser’s Knowledge of the Untrue Fact or Omission 
The section 712(A)(2) requirements of knowledge and reliance 
have been infrequently interpreted by Louisiana courts, but the text 
of section 712(A)(2) is nearly identical to the text of section 12(2). 
Section 712(A)(2) states clearly that the “buyer” must not “know[] 
of the untruth or omission,”73 while the section 12(2) purchaser 
similarly must show that he did “not know[] of [the] untruth or 
omission.”74  
There is, however, no requirement that the buyer prove reliance 
on the untruth or omission. Recently, Judge Hicks in Macareno so 
held,75 as did a panel of the Fifth Circuit,76 thus confirming that, 
under section 712(A)(2) of the Louisiana Securities Law, the 
investor need not prove that he or she relied on any statements to 
recover, just like a section 12(2) claim.77 
E. Loss Causation 
Section 712(A)(2) does not explicitly state that loss 
causation—a causal connection between the misrepresentation and 
the loss—is an element of a Louisiana Securities Law fraud 
claim.78 However, one older case as well as a post-financial crisis 
                                                                                                             
 
significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.” See also 
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 249 (1988) (adopting TSC Industries 
materiality test for the Section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 context). 
 73. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:712(A)(2) (2003). 
 74. §12(2). 
 75. Macareno, 2010 WL 743564, at *5 (stating that “it is clear that reliance 
is not a part of the requirements for fraud in Louisiana” when discussing the 
investors’ Louisiana Securities Law claim). See also Taylor v. First Jersey Sec., 
Inc., 533 So. 2d 1383, 1385–86 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (setting forth the elements 
of a Louisiana Securities Law cause of action, which do not include reliance as 
listed).  
 76. Heck v. Triche, 775 F.3d 265, 281 (5th Cir. 2014) (“Section 712 does not 
require a plaintiff to prove that he relied on the defendant’s misrepresentation or 
omission.”). 
 77. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 576 (1995) (noting the 
1933 Securities Act section 12(2) grants “buyers a right to rescind without proof 
of reliance”); Wright v. Nat’l Warranty Co., 953 F.2d 256, 262 (6th Cir. 1992) 
(“Section 12(2) . . . has no requirement of justifiable reliance on the part of a 
purchaser.” (citation omitted)); Schlesinger v. Herzog, 2 F.3d 135, 141 (5th Cir. 
1993) (scienter and reliance are not elements of a section 12(2) claim). 
 78. Loss causation is different from transaction causation. Loss causation is 
“a causal connection between the material misrepresentation and the loss.” Dura 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005) (citation omitted). 
“Transaction causation is akin to reliance, and requires only an allegation that 




case both hold that loss causation is an essential element of a 
section 712(A)(2) claim.79 
These cases’ interpretations of Louisiana Securities Law are 
different than the requirements for a section 12(2) claim. Section 
12(2) does not require the plaintiff–purchaser to prove loss 
causation but instead provides the defendant–seller an affirmative 
defense of loss causation: the defendant–seller may prove that the 
losses claimed are not the result of the “depreciation in value of the 
subject security resulting from” the untruth or omission.80  
Interestingly, the language of section 12(2) was amended in 
1995 to specifically include the loss causation affirmative defense.81 
Before that amendment, the language of section 12(2) did not even 
mention loss causation, and at least some federal courts held that a 
section 12(2) claim did not require proof of loss causation.82 The 
                                                                                                             
 
‘but for the claimed misrepresentations or omissions, the plaintiff would not 
have entered into the detrimental securities transaction.’” Lentell v. Merrill 
Lynch & Co., Inc., 396 F.3d 161, 172 (2d Cir. 2005). Reliance is not an element 
of a section 712(A)(2) claim. See discussion supra Part III.D. 
 79. Fishman v. Morgan Keegan & Co., No. 10–2, 2011 WL 4853367, at 
*11 (E.D. La. Oct. 13, 2011) (“Loss causation is . . . an essential element of 
Plaintiffs’ claims under Louisiana’s Blue Sky Law.”), aff’d on other grounds by 
Fishman v. Morgan Keegan & Co., 574 F. App’x 449 (5th Cir. 2014). See also 
Williams v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 556 So. 2d 914, 916 (La. Ct. App. 1990) 
(explaining that a claim under the Louisiana Blue Sky Law “is governed by the 
causation standard articulated in numerous federal cases interpreting federal 
securities law”). 
 80. 15 U.S.C. § 77l(b) (2012); In re Adams Golf, Inc. Sec. Litig., 381 F.3d 
267, 277 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Under sections 11 and 12(a)(2), plaintiffs do not bear 
the burden of proving causation. It is the defendants who may assert, as an 
affirmative defense, that a lower share value did not result from any nondisclosure 
or false statement.” (citing, inter alia, § 77l(b)). 
 81. See Dec. 22, 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, Title I, § 105, 109 Stat. 757. The 
loss causation requirement for a Section 12(2) claim reads: 
(b) Loss causation 
In an action described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, if the person 
who offered or sold such security proves that any portion or all of the 
amount recoverable under subsection (a)(2) of this section represents 
other than the depreciation in value of the subject security resulting 
from such part of the prospectus or oral communication, with respect to 
which the liability of that person is asserted, not being true or omitting 
to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to 
make the statement not misleading, then such portion or amount, as the 
case may be, shall not be recoverable. 
§ 12(2). 
 82. See 15 U.S.C. § 77l (1994); see also Casella v. Webb, 883 F.2d 805, 808 
(9th Cir. 1989) (For a section 12(2) claim, “[t]he buyer need not show any causal 
connection between the misrepresentation and his damage; indeed, he need not 




language of section 712(A)(2) resembles section 12(2) before the 
1995 amendment added the loss causation affirmative defense.83 
Nevertheless, under at least two decisions, loss causation is an 
essential element of a Louisiana Securities Law fraud claim.84 
The loss causation requirement recognized by the Williams and 
Fishman courts is good policy, deserving of its foothold in Louisiana 
caselaw. Requiring investors to prove loss causation ensures that 
investors who seek to recover losses resulting from market 
conditions rather than the defendant’s misrepresentation or 
omission do not obtain a windfall. Allowing investors to recover 
such market losses also unfairly penalizes defendant–sellers, 
potentially requiring them to compensate investors for market 
losses that investors knew were possible when the investment was 
made. 
F. Scienter and Knowledge of the Untruth or Omission 
A section 712(A)(2) claim under Louisiana law does not appear 
to require the plaintiff to prove scienter—an intent to deceive, 
manipulate, or defraud—with perhaps one notable exception. The 
text of sections 712(A) and 714(A) nowhere mentions deception, 
manipulation, or fraud.85 And although the Louisiana Supreme 
Court has not addressed the issue, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeal in Landry v. Thibaut has held that the standard is 
negligence, unlike the standard for a federal Rule 10b–5 claim, 
                                                                                                             
 
even show that he has been damaged.” (quoting L. LOSS, FUNDAMENTALS OF 
SECURITIES REGULATION 873 (1988))). 
 83. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77l (1994), with LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
51:712(A) (2003). 
 84. Fishman v. Morgan Keegan & Co., No. 10–2, 2011 WL 4853367, at 
*11 (E.D. La. Oct. 13, 2011) (“Loss causation is . . . an essential element of 
Plaintiffs’ claims under Louisiana’s Blue Sky Law.”). See also Williams v. 
Edward D. Jones & Co., 556 So. 2d 914, 916 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that a 
claim under the Louisiana Blue Sky Law “is governed by the causation standard 
articulated in numerous federal cases interpreting federal securities law”). The 
Fifth Circuit recently affirmed Fishman. See Fishman v. Morgan Keegan & Co., 
574 F. App’x 449 (5th Cir. 2014). The Fifth Circuit, however, did not reach the 
issue whether loss causation is an element of a section 712(A)(2) claim. Instead, 
it concluded that the investors failed to preserve their argument on that issue, 
while also stating that “[t]he question whether the Louisiana Securities Law 
requires proof of loss causation does not have a straightforward answer.” Id. at 
454. Even more recently the Fifth Circuit reiterated that whether loss causation 
is an element of a section 712 claim “is uncertain.” Heck v. Triche, 775 F.3d 
265, 280 n.15 (5th Cir. 2014).  
 85. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:712, 51:714 (2003). 




which requires scienter.86 The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit, citing Landry, also has stated that “[s]ection 712 
does not require a plaintiff to establish scienter, but, like Section 
12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, requires only a showing that 
the defendant was negligent.”87 These pronouncements are 
supported by the text of section 712(A)(2), which specifically 
refers to “the exercise of reasonable care” rather than deception, 
manipulation, or fraud.88 
One exception is for cases where the financial advisor 
allegedly churns the investor’s account—that is, makes excessive 
purchases and sales in the investor’s account for the purpose of 
generating commissions that benefit the advisor. In 1988, the 
Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal in Taylor v. First Jersey 
Securities, Inc. addressed whether the plaintiff investor had stated 
a cause of action for, inter alia, churning under the Louisiana 
Securities Law, and concluded that section 712(A) was broad 
enough to encompass a claim for churning.89 The court’s analysis 
began with a review of the text of section 712(A)(2), which does 
not mention scienter.90 But the court later referred to the elements 
of a churning claim under section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5—which 
specifically include scienter—and in the next sentence stated that 
the petition in question “makes all the required allegations.”91 
Although this language does not appear to explicitly adopt for 
Louisiana the elements of a churning claim under federal law, the 
court’s reference to scienter suggests that scienter must be proven 
to prevail on a churning claim under the Louisiana Securities 
Law.92 No Louisiana courts have addressed this issue since the 
Taylor decision in 1988. 
For a non-churning case, it appears that negligence is the 
standard. But open questions remain: What is the burden of proof, 
and who bears that burden—the plaintiff–investor or the defendant–
seller?  
                                                                                                             
 86. Landry v. Thibaut, 523 So. 2d 1370, 1380 (La. Ct. App. 1988). 
 87. Heck, 775 F.3d at 280 (citing Landry, 523 So. 2d at 1380). 
 88. Of course, the Louisiana Securities Law does reference fraud and deceit 
in section 712(D), but as explained supra the Louisiana Legislature did not 
provide a private cause of action for violations of section 712(D). See discussion 
supra Part II. 
 89. Taylor v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 533 So. 2d 1383, 1386 (La. Ct. App. 1988). 
 90. Id. at 1385–86. See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:712(A) (2003). 
 91. Taylor, 533 So. 2d at 1386 (citing Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 
F.2d 318, 324 (5th Cir. 1981)). 
 92. The court’s reference to a federal 10b–5 churning claim, rather than to 
section 12(2)—the federal analogue to section 712(A)(2)—and the absence of a 
scienter requirement in the text of section 712(A)(2) calls into question whether 
Taylor was correct in recognizing a churning claim under Louisiana law. 




Ambiguous wording of section 712(A)(2) following a statutory 
amendment has led to conflicting caselaw on these issues. Before a 
1999 amendment, the last clause of section 712(A)(2) read: “if 
such person shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not 
know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have 
known, of the untruth or omission.”93 In 1996, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court in State v. Powdrill considered this language in the 
context of a criminal prosecution for a purported violation of 
section 712(A)(2).94 The court interpreted the phrase “such person” 
to refer to the seller and agreed with the prosecution’s description 
of this last clause as an affirmative defense for which the seller 
bears the burden of proof.95 In fact, the court held that section 
712(A)(2) was unconstitutional to the extent that, in criminal 
prosecutions, it imposed on the defendant–seller a duty to prove 
what the court considered to be “an essential element” of a 
criminal violation of section 712(A)(2).96 
The Powdrill court’s view of section 712(A)(2), if not its ruling 
of unconstitutionality, was consistent with federal courts’ 
interpretations of similar language in section 12(2). Section 12(2) 
imposes liability upon a seller “who shall not sustain the burden of 
proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care 
could not have known, of such untruth or omission.”97  
In an apparent response to the Powdrill decision, the Louisiana 
Legislature in 1999 amended section 712(A)(2) and deleted the 
phrase beginning with “shall not sustain the burden of proof that he 
did not know.”98 After the amendment, section 712(A)(2) read as it 
does now: 
A. It shall be unlawful for any person: 
 
* * * 
 
(2) To offer to sell or to sell a security by means of any oral 
or written untrue statement of a material fact or any 
omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make 
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they are made, not misleading, the buyer not 
knowing of the untruth or omission, if such person in the 
                                                                                                             
 93. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:712(A)(2) (1998) (subsequently amended). 
 94. 684 So. 2d 350 (La. 1996). 
 95. Id. at 354. 
 96. Id. at 356. 
 97. Securities Act of 1933, § 12(2) (as amended), 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (2012). 
 98. Act No. 250, 1999 La. Acts 1094–95. 




exercise of reasonable care could not have known of the 
untruth or omission.99 
One might think that the Powdrill decision, along with the 
subsequent legislative amendment, shows that “such person” in 
section 712(A)(2) still refers to the defendant–seller, as it did prior 
to the amendment. One also might think that the plaintiff now must 
prove that “such person”—the defendant–seller—“in the exercise 
of reasonable care could not have known of the untruth or 
omission.”100  
Such a reading of section 712(A)(2), however, would lead to 
odd results. A securities plaintiff would seem to negate the 
defendant’s negligence if he or she succeeded in proving that “in 
the exercise of reasonable care [the defendant] could not have 
known of the untruth or omission.”101 If the plaintiff were required 
to offer such proof, then arguably the plaintiff never could prove 
that the defendant breached the standard of care in failing to 
disclose what he or she could not have known. Or, as the Fifth 
Circuit recently put it, the statute would “penalize[] a seller that did 
not know, and, acting with reasonable care, still could not have 
known, of the falsity of the statement or the misleading nature of 
the omission.”102 Courts in Louisiana have interpreted the language 
in an attempt to make sense of the statute.103 No consensus has 
been reached, however, and perhaps none will be reached until the 
Legislature amends the statute to add clarity or the Louisiana 
Supreme Court offers its interpretation. 
Three interpretations have developed since the 1999 
amendment. Several Louisiana courts, including three after the start 
of the most recent financial crisis, have concluded that the plaintiff 
bears the burden of proving that “the defendant knew, or in the 
exercise of reasonable diligence, could have known, of the untruth 
or omission.”104 These courts effectively read the word “not” out of 
                                                                                                             
 99. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:712(A)(2) (2003). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Heck v. Triche, 775 F.3d 265, 279 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 103. See infra notes 104, 105, 107. 
 104. See Heck, 775 F.3d at 279–80 (concluding that the current language of 
section 712(A)(2) was the product of a “scrivener’s error” included when the 
statute was amended in 1999 and “that the legislature simply intended to remove 
the burden of proof of demonstrating the exercise of reasonable care from the 
defendant and require the plaintiff, or state in a criminal proceeding, to prove the 
defendant’s knowledge or negligence”); Bamburg v. Axis Onshore LP, No. 08-
1466, 2009 WL 1579512, at *9 (W.D. La. June 4, 2009) (holding the plaintiff 
bears the burden of proving that “the defendant knew, or in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence, could have known, of the untruth or omission”); Ponthier 




the last clause in section 712(A)(2) and require the plaintiff to 
prove that the defendant breached the standard of care by not 
discovering the untruth or omission. This interpretation is 
consistent with Powdrill and with the 1999 amendment in that it 
places the burden of proof on this issue on the plaintiff. 
Taking a different view, Judge Hicks in Macareno v. Karon 
ascribed a meaning to the word “not” in the statute, concluding that 
the statute requires proof that “in the exercise of reasonable care 
[defendant] could not have known of the untruth or omission.”105 
Citing pre-1999 amendment caselaw, Judge Hicks interpreted the 
provision as an affirmative defense, specifically stating that it is 
the defendant’s burden to offer such proof.106 Although it gives 
meaning to the word “not” in the statute, this interpretation appears 
to give little consideration to the Powdrill court’s holding that the 
attempt by the prior version of the statute to place the burden on 
the defendant was unconstitutional in criminal cases or to the 
Legislature’s subsequent attempt to cure the constitutional problem 
identified in Powdrill.  
The third and final view that has developed since the 1999 
amendment was in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Louisiana in Fishman v. Morgan Keegan & Co.107 
There, Judge Carl Barbier interpreted section 712(A)(2) as placing 
the burden of proof on the plaintiff–investor, consistent with 
Powdrill and the 1999 amendment.108 Judge Barbier, however, 
appears to have required the plaintiff–investor to prove that he or 
she—not the defendant–seller—in the exercise of reasonable care 
could not have known of the untruth or omission.109 In so doing, 
                                                                                                             
 
v. Manalla, 951 So. 2d 1242, 1255 (La. Ct. App. 2007) (same); George v. White, 
101 So. 3d 1036, 1045 (La. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting section 712(A)(2) and 
concluding that the plaintiff “has offered no evidence that [defendant] knew or 
‘in the exercise of reasonable care’ could have known, that the statements made 
in the subscription agreement were not true”). 
 105. See Macareno v. Karon, No. 08–0292, 2010 WL 743564, at *4 (W.D. 
La. Feb. 24, 2010) (“[W]hile plaintiff must plead all elements, ‘defendant must 
sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of 
reasonable care could not have known of the untruth or omission.’” (quoting 
Landry v. Thibaut, 523 So. 2d 1370, 1380 (La. Ct. App. 1988))). 
 106. See id. 
 107. Fishman v. Morgan Keegan & Co., No. 10–2, 2011 WL 4853367, at *11 
(E.D. La. Oct. 13, 2011). 
 108. See id. 
 109. See id. (“Section 712(A)(2) of the Louisiana Blue Sky Law specifically 
provides that a buyer may only maintain a claim for securities fraud if ‘in the 
exercise of reasonable care [he] could not have known of the untruth or 
omission.’”). 




the court necessarily interpreted the phrase “such person” in the last 
clause of section 712(A)(2) to mean the investor–plaintiff or 
“buyer,” rather than the defendant–seller. Such a reading gives 
effect to the word “not” in the last clause of section 712(A)(2). And 
it reasonably concludes that the phrase “such person” refers back to 
the word “buyer” in the previous clause, which is logical given that 
“buyer” is the last “person” to which the statute refers before the 
phrase “such person” in the last clause appears. Although Judge 
Barbier’s view is the best of the three interpretations emerging since 
the 1999 amendment, it nonetheless creates some tension with the 
history of section 712(A)(2) and its federal counterpart, both of 
which suggest the focus of the last clause is on the defendant’s 
knowledge, not that of the plaintiff–investor.  
In the end, none of these three interpretations is perfect, and the 
poorly worded 1999 amendment is to blame. Unless the Legislature 
amends the statute to add clarity or the Louisiana Supreme Court 
considers and resolves the issue, these three divergent and imperfect 
interpretations of section 712(A)(2) and perhaps others will 
proliferate in the jurisprudence, causing uncertainty for securities 
litigants and investors. 
IV. CONTROL PERSON LIABILITY FOR VIOLATIONS 
OF SECTION 712(A)(2) 
Louisiana sets forth control person liability for those who 
violate the analogue to a federal section 12(2) claim.110 Control 
person liability generally is available to an investor against persons 
who, although not the seller of the securities, participated in a 
transaction and could have exercised control over the transaction 
and stopped the sale.  
Control person liability, like many other securities law concepts, 
can be found in federal law.111 Although there is some split of 
                                                                                                             
 110. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:714(B) (2003).  
 111. 15 U.S.C. § 77o(a) (2012). The full text of that statute reads: 
Every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or 
otherwise, or who, pursuant to or in connection with an agreement or 
understanding with one or more other persons by or through stock 
ownership, agency, or otherwise, controls any person liable under 
sections 77k or 77l of this title, shall also be liable jointly and severally 
with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person to 
whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person 
had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the existence 
of the facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled person is 
alleged to exist. 
Id. 




authority,112 the prevailing view among the federal courts of appeal 
is that control person liability attaches where the defendant 
participated in the general operations of the violator and possessed 
the power to control the specific activity complained of.113 
Under the Louisiana Securities Law, control person liability is 
similar to control person liability under federal law. Louisiana 
control person liability extends to those “who directly or indirectly 
control[]” a person liable for violating section 712(A)(2), and to 
“every general partner, executive officer, or director of such person 
liable . . . , every person occupying a similar status or performing 
similar functions, and every dealer or salesman who participates in 
any material way in the sale is liable jointly and severally.”114 
Louisiana courts have had few occasions to interpret this statute, 
even after the 2008–2009 financial crisis. On the occasions 
Louisiana courts have had to interpret this statute, they have 
determined that a supervisor of a seller was a control person, as 
were corporate directors of a seller, while an auditor of a seller, a 
bank that allegedly induced the sale of securities, and corporations 
whose employees were on the board of directors of a seller were 
not control persons.115 From these cases, it seems some Louisiana 
                                                                                                             
 112. See In re Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n Sec., Deriv., & “ERISA” Litig., 
503 F. Supp. 2d 25, 43 (D.D.C. 2007) (describing split of authority). 
 113. See, e.g., Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 631 (8th Cir. 1985); see also 
Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 974 F.2d 873, 881 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(explaining that the court considers “whether the alleged control-person actually 
participated in, that is, exercised control over, the operations of the person in 
general and, then, to whether the alleged control-person possessed the power or 
ability to control the specific transaction or activity upon which the primary 
violation was predicated, whether or not that power was exercised”). The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit requires the plaintiff to “at least 
show that the defendant had an ability to control the specific transaction or 
activity upon which the primary violation is based,” but has not determined 
whether the plaintiff must also show the defendant actually exercised such 
control, or whether the plaintiff must show general involvement in the 
operations of the violator. See Heck v. Triche, 775 F.3d 265, 283 & n.18 (5th 
Cir. 2014). 
 114. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:714(B) (2003).  
 115. See Bornstein v. Fed. Dep. Ins. Corp., No. 89–3052, 1991 WL 195812, 
at *2 (E.D. La. Sept. 6, 1991) (finding a fact issue existed as to whether 
defendants, who were on the board of directors of the seller, owned stock in the 
seller, and approved the stock offering at issue, were control persons); Marrero 
v. Banco di Roma (Chicago), 487 F. Supp. 568, 579 (E.D. La. 1980) (finding a 
bank that allegedly induced a sale by failing to disclose certain facts not a 
control person); Se. Wireless Network, Inc. v. U.S. Telemetry Corp., No. 06–
1920, 2007 WL 1953148, at *2–3 (La. Ct. App. July 6, 2007) (finding a company 
whose employee was a director for the seller company not liable as control 
person); Solow v. Heard McElroy & Vestal L.L.P., 7 So. 3d 1269, 1281 (La. Ct. 
App. 2009) (finding an accountant auditing seller not a control person); Taylor v. 




courts focus on the language of the statute, which imposes liability 
on “general partner[s], executive officer[s], or director[s],” as well 
as “dealer[s] or salesm[e]n who participate[]” in the sale.116  
At least one federal court, the Fifth Circuit in Heck v. Triche, 
focused less on the wording of section 714. Instead it observed that 
the “Louisiana precedent is thin on when a defendant ‘controls’ a 
primary violator” and “look[ed] to federal law for instruction.”117 
Applying the Fifth Circuit’s federal control-person test,118 the Heck 
court held that an accountant was liable as a control person.119 The 
court’s conclusion relied heavily on the clear-error standard of 
review and testimony from the primary violator, who testified that 
he was dependent on the accountant to help him emerge from debt, 
that the accountant “approved the financial concepts detailed in the 
prospectus” and helped arrange financing for the primary violator’s 
debt, and that the accountant had discussions with investors about 
the collateral that was supposed to have secured their investment.120 
Heck demonstrates that individuals peripherally involved in the 
transaction at issue and that are not general partners, executives, 
supervisors, and the like may nonetheless be subject to control 
person liability. Whether such liability ultimately attaches will 
depend on the specific facts of the case.121  
V. DAMAGES AVAILABLE 
Similar to the caselaw interpreting the elements of a cause of 
action for a violation of section 712(A)(2), the caselaw interpreting 
the damages available to a successful plaintiff–investor is also 
undeveloped. The statute itself sets forth a remedy in two parts: one 
for those investors who still hold the shares purchased, and another 
for investors who have already sold their shares. How these 
remedies are implemented in particular factual circumstances may 
                                                                                                             
 
First Jersey Sec., Inc., 533 So. 2d 1383, 1387 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (finding a 
supervisor of seller liable as control person). 
 116. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:714(B) (2003). 
 117. Heck, 775 F.3d at 283. 
 118. See supra note 113. 
 119. See Heck, 775 F.3d at 284. 
 120. See id. at 284. 
 121. The Heck court underscored the fact-specific nature of the control 
person inquiry by distinguishing Solow, a case in which the Louisiana Court of 
Appeal for the Second Circuit held that an accountant providing audit services 
was not liable as a control person. See id. Because in Heck the accountant was 
not alleged to have controlled the primary violator “in his capacity as the CPA,” 
the Fifth Circuit concluded that the defendant’s actions in Heck “went far 
beyond the auditing services at issue in Solow.” Id. at 285. 




vary, given that securities transactions come in all shapes and sizes, 
and investments are made and securities sold in a variety of market 
conditions. 
The availability of attorneys’ fees also may vary, depending on 
whether the investor continues to hold, or has sold, the investment. 
An aggrieved investor who has not already sold his or her shares 
may obtain rescission plus attorneys’ fees, interest, and court 
costs.122 By contrast, where the investor already has sold his or her 
shares, the investor is only entitled to “damages,” defined by the 
statute as “the difference between the fair value of the consideration 
the buyer gave for the security and the fair value of the security at 
the time the buyer disposed of it, plus interest thereon from the date 
of payment to the date of repayment.”123 There is no mention in the 
definition of “damages” of attorneys’ fees or court costs.124 It 
therefore seems that attorneys’ fees and court costs are not 
recoverable when the investor has already sold her shares. There is 
no readily apparent reason why the Louisiana Legislature would 
have intended to allow aggrieved investors who have not sold their 
investment to recover attorneys’ fees while affording those who 
have sold their investment no such right. Nonetheless, the plain 
language of the statute favors that interpretation. 
VI. PRESCRIPTION AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
Some defenses are available for the seller whose purchaser has 
stated a prima facie case under the Louisiana Securities Law. 
Prescription is chief among these defenses. For all causes of action 
available under the Louisiana Securities Law, including a claim 
under section 712(A)(2), “[n]o person may sue . . . more than two 
years from the date of the contract for sale or sale, if there is no 
contract for sale.”125 Because Louisiana applies the doctrine of 
contra non valentem, prescription in most cases “does not begin to 
run until the plaintiffs have either actual knowledge of a violation or 
                                                                                                             
 122. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:714(B) (2003). 
 123. See id. § 51:714(A) (setting forth a remedy of “damages if [investor] no 
longer owns the security”).  
 124. Id. (“Damages are the amount which equals the difference between the 
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 125. Id. § 51:714(C)(1). See also Williams v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 556 
So. 2d 914, 916 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that there is a two year prescriptive 
period for a Louisiana Securities Law claim).  




notice of facts which, in the exercise of due diligence, should lead to 
actual knowledge.”126 
Some affirmative defenses are available as well. Most defenses, 
however, are not set forth in the Louisiana Securities Law itself but 
are nonetheless available under Louisiana law generally.127 In fact, 
the Louisiana Securities Law does not identify any affirmative 
defenses except for one possible exception—that in the exercise of 
reasonable care, the defendant–seller could not have known of the 
untruth or omission.128 Although at least one court identified the 
seller’s exercise of reasonable care as an affirmative defense, other 
Louisiana courts have squarely held that the plaintiff bears the 
burden of proving that the defendant–seller could not have known of 
the untruth or omission.129 Thus, whether the reasonable care issue 
is an affirmative defense at all, or is merely part of the plaintiff’s 
prima facie case, remains unsettled.  
What appears reasonably clear, however, is that those persons 
facing control-person liability may assert reasonable care as a 
defense. Section 714(B) specifically says that control persons are 
liable “unless the person whose liability arises under this Subsection 
sustains the burden of proof that he did not know and in the exercise 
of reasonable care could not have known of the existence of the 
facts by reason of which liability is alleged to exist.”130 
Defendants to a Louisiana Securities Law claim also may draw 
upon some affirmative defenses that are recognized under common 
law and in federal securities law cases. The affirmative defenses of 
in pari delicto, waiver, ratification, estoppel, laches, and failure to 
mitigate damages have been recognized by some courts as available 
                                                                                                             
 126. Beckstrom v. Parnell, 730 So. 2d 942, 947 (La. Ct. App. 1998). See also 
Kidd v. Symbion, Inc., No. 10–3361, 2011 WL 4020814, at *7–8 (E.D. La. Sept. 
9, 2011); Delgado v. Ctr. on Children, Inc., No. 10–2753, 2012 WL 2878622, at 
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would cause a reasonable man to inquire whether he has suffered a legal wrong. 
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 127. The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure lists certain affirmative defenses 
that must be set forth by the defendant with its answer. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. 
art. 1005 (2015). 
 128. See Macareno v. Karon, No. 08–0292, 2010 WL 743564, at *4 (W.D. 
La. Feb. 24, 2010) (“[W]hile plaintiff must plead all elements, ‘defendant must 
sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of 
reasonable care could not have known of the untruth or omission.’” (quoting 
Landry v. Thibaut, 523 So. 2d 1370, 1380 (La. Ct. App. 1988))). 
 129. See discussion supra Part III.F.  
 130. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:714(B) (2003). 




to those defending federal securities claims.131 No Louisiana court 
has expressly recognized or rejected any of these defenses as being 
available to those against whom a Louisiana Securities Law claim 
has been asserted.  
Nevertheless, some guidance to the question of whether these 
defenses are available for Louisiana Securities Law claims can be 
found in non-securities cases in which these affirmative defenses are 
discussed generally. For example, Louisiana law plainly does not 
recognize the common law defense of laches.132 However, the 
concept of equitable estoppel has been recognized by Louisiana 
courts,133 although it is not favored, and the defenses of waiver and 
ratification have been recognized as well.134 
Perhaps the most important affirmative defense available is 
comparative fault pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code article 2323(A). 
Under Louisiana law, “[i]n any action for damages where a person 
suffers injury, death, or loss, the degree or percentage of fault of all 
persons causing or contributing to the injury, death, or loss shall be 
determined.”135 This code article, by its own terms, applies to “any 
                                                                                                             
 131. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 634–35 (1988) (noting that an in para 
delicto defense is available under any federal securities law cause of action); Davis 
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 906 F.2d 1206, 1213 (8th Cir. 
1990) (recognizing defenses of estoppel, ratification, and waiver to Rule 10b–5 
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 132. Fishbein v. State ex rel. La. State Univ. Health Scis. Ctr., 898 So. 2d 
1260, 1270 (La. 2005) (“Because the doctrine of laches is in conflict with this 
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 133. See Roberson v. Lafayette Oilman’s Sporting Clays Shoot, Inc., 845 So. 
2d 1267, 1270 (La. 2003) (“Equitable estoppel or ‘estoppel in pais’ can be 
defined as the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is barred from asserting 
rights against another party justifiably relying on such conduct and who has 
changed his position to his detriment as a result of such reliance.” (citation 
omitted)). See also Morris v. Friedman, 663 So. 2d 19, 25 (La. 1995) (noting that 
“estoppels are not favored in our law” and that “[e]quitable considerations and 
estoppel cannot be permitted to prevail when in conflict with the positive written 
law”); Harvey v. Richard, 7 So. 2d 674, 677 (La. 1942) (“The cases holding that 
estoppels are not favored by our courts are legion in our jurisprudence.”); Waste 
Mgmt. of La. v. Penn-America Ins. Co., 110 So. 3d 200, 203–04 (La. Ct. App. 
2013). 
 134. Hogan Exploration, Inc. v. Monroe Eng’g Ass’n, Inc., 430 So. 2d 696, 
700–01 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (identifying affirmative defenses of waiver and 
ratification); Favret v. Favret, 527 So. 2d 463, 467 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (same). 
 135. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2323(A) (2015). 




action for damages,” which necessarily includes causes of action 
under the Louisiana Securities Law.136 Accordingly, the comparative 
fault defense allows defendants of Louisiana Securities Law claims to 
reduce their percentage of fault by attributing fault to others involved 
in causing the alleged loss, including the investor or any other 
advisors.137 Moreover, because section 712(A)(2) is based upon 
federal section 12(2),138 and because Louisiana courts look to 
federal law for guidance on interpreting Louisiana’s Securities 
Law,139 the defenses available to a section 12(2) claim should be 
available to a section 712(A)(2) claim to the extent those defenses 
are allowed under Louisiana law. 
CONCLUSION 
Even though the Louisiana Securities Law was enacted almost 
100 years ago, the caselaw interpreting the Louisiana Securities Law 
remains undeveloped compared to many other areas of Louisiana 
law. The 2008–2009 financial crisis gave Louisiana courts some 
opportunity to interpret provisions of the Louisiana Securities Law, 
but most provisions still have seldom been interpreted, leaving 
uncertainty on many important securities law questions. Some cases 
whose treatment of issues have raised more questions than they have 
answered, such as the question of reasonable care, add to this 
uncertainty. Of course, no one can predict when many of these 
questions will be presented to a Louisiana circuit court or the 
Louisiana Supreme Court. Until such time, litigants invoking the 
Louisiana Securities Law will be left to glean what they can from 
the sparse Louisiana caselaw and then fill the gaps with reference to 
the vast body of caselaw interpreting the analogous section 12(2) 
claim under the Securities Act of 1933. 
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 137. A notable exception to this rule is where a defendant conspires with 
another defendant to commit an intentional tort. In this narrow circumstance, 
comparative fault principles do not apply. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2324(A) (2015). In 
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 138. See supra note 33. 
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